Are Saudi Arabia And Uae Two Different Countries

The government held its first-ever elections in 2005 and 2011, when Saudis went to the polls to elect municipal councilors. In December 2015, women were allowed to vote and stand as candidates for the first time in municipal council elections, with 19 women winning seats. After King SALMAN ascended to the throne in 2015, he placed the first next-generation prince, MUHAMMAD BIN NAYIF bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud, in the line of succession as Crown Prince. He designated his son, MUHAMMAD BIN SALMAN bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud, as the Deputy Crown Prince. In March 2015, Saudi Arabia led a coalition of 10 countries in a military campaign to restore the legitimate government of Yemen, which had been ousted by Huthi forces allied with former president ALI ABDULLAH al-Salih.

The war in Yemen has drawn international criticism for civilian casualties and its effect on the country's dire humanitarian situation. In December 2015, then Deputy Crown Prince MUHAMMAD BIN SALMAN announced Saudi Arabia would lead a 34-nation Islamic Coalition to fight terrorism . In May 2017, Saudi Arabia inaugurated the Global Center for Combatting Extremist Ideology (also known as "Etidal") as part of its ongoing efforts to counter violent extremism. For more than two decades, the Gulf monarchies have found themselves at the center of countless geopolitical, economic, and strategic challenges at the regional level. Among these, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have emerged as pivotal actors in the climate of strong transformations taking place in the whole MENA area.

This trend has often led them to act and move in coordination but has also sometimes caused noisy and unthinkable misalignments. One of the most remarkable occurred in July during the summit of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries , which was also extended to include international players who are not part of the world energy cartel. The reason for tension concerned the proposal – mainly supported by Saudi Arabia and Russia – to increase oil production to 400,000 barrels a day from August, combined with the idea of extending the agreement on production cuts until the end of 2022.

These two solutions would avoid large fluctuations in crude oil prices and keep them relatively high for the coming year, but they have been firmly rejected by the UAE. Indeed, Abu Dhabi is less dependent on oil revenues than its Saudi counterpart – the sector accounts for 42% of Riyadh's gross domestic product , compared to 30% of Abu Dhabi's GDP – and intends to use the discussion to achieve better terms within OPEC+. They both worry about the development of Iran's nuclear program and Tehran's regional influence, with both sides exposed to potential Iranian attack and the United Arab Emirates hosting a large Iranian diaspora whose loyalty has in the past been questioned by Emirati authorities.

They are both seeking to escape the shackles of rentier economics into a post-hydrocarbon future before the global market makes oil unprofitable. They are dominated by powerful royal personalities — Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Saudi Arabia and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed in Abu Dhabi — who both agree that regional reform does not include political liberalization. These commonalities have propelled a close relationship both between the two rulers — the Emirati crown prince has been a mentor to his younger Saudi counterpart — and their countries' foreign policies. The Gulf port cities have a long history of ties with Africa, centred around maritime trade and dating to the era before the Emirates united as a nation-state. From 2011, however, Abu Dhabi began to look at the countries along the Red Sea coast as more than commercial partners.

Turmoil in the Middle East, Iran's growing regional influence, piracy emanating from Somalia and, from 2015, the war in Yemen combined to turn the corridor's stability into a core strategic interest. The 2017 Gulf crisis, which saw Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt cut ties with Qatar, pushed leaders on both sides of the divide to double down on their alliances, including in the Horn. Since then, the UAE has nailed down diplomatic relationships and extended its reach, particularly along the Red Sea. The United States has had friendly relations with the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) since 1971, following its formation and independence from the United Kingdom.

The U.A.E. plays an influential role in the Middle East, and is a key partner for the United States. The United States and the U.A.E. enjoy strong bilateral cooperation on a full range of issues including defense, non-proliferation, trade, law enforcement, energy policy, and cultural exchange. The two countries work together to promote peace and security, support economic growth, and improve educational opportunities in the region and around the world. The United Arab Emirates has emerged in recent months as an important protagonist in the Horn of Africa. Through political alliances, aid, investment, military base agreements and port contracts, it is expanding its influence in the region.

A recent manifestation came in the summer of 2018, when Eritrea and Ethiopia announced – after a flurry of visits to and from Emirati officials – that they had reached an agreement to end their twenty-year war. Competition between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, on the one hand, and Qatar on the other, spilled into Somalia beginning in late 2017, aggravating friction between Mogadishu and Somali regional leaders. As its influence in the Horn grows, the UAE should build on its Eritrea-Ethiopia peace-making by continuing to underwrite and promote that deal, while at the same time looking to reconcile with the Somali government. The UAE's dependence on oil is a significant long-term challenge, although the UAE is one of the most diversified countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council. Low oil prices have prompted the UAE to cut expenditures, including on some social programs, but the UAE has sufficient assets in its sovereign investment funds to cover its deficits. The government reduced fuel subsidies in August 2015, and introduced excise taxes (50% on sweetened carbonated beverages and 100% on energy drinks and tobacco) in October 2017.

The UAE's strategic plan for the next few years focuses on economic diversification, promoting the UAE as a global trade and tourism hub, developing industry, and creating more job opportunities for nationals through improved education and increased private sector employment. Abu Dhabi says that it wants a stable Somalia, but the country is likely to remain volatile unless strong Emirati ties to Somali regional leaders are paired with a reconciled UAE relationship with Mogadishu. Abu Dhabi could pledge to inform Farmajo's government of its activities in the federal states – whether training security forces or developing ports – and ensure that its investment and aid benefit the country and not only its regions. The UAE also might encourage its allies in the federal states to repair their own ties to Mogadishu. The Gulf region has emerged as a top destination for thousands of foreign workers, making it one of the most important migration regions in the world. Enormous hydrocarbon natural resources and consistent political stability have been at the heart of shaping the region into a lucrative destination for many unskilled workers, but also for highly skilled foreign labor.

With strict regulations including lack of a citizenship path, no real investment opportunities and a large stock of foreign workers, the GCC countries are also among the top remitting countries in the world, accounting for almost one-quarter of the total official remittance. The large remittance outflows from the Gulf allowed the GCC countries to play both positive and negative roles in the development of several cities and regions. Regardless, labor migration to the GCC countries is a very important part of its recent history. The UAE's monetary policy stresses stability and predictability, as the Central Bank of the UAE keeps a peg to the US Dollar and moves interest rates close to the Federal Funds Rate. This policy makes sense in the current situation of global and regional economic and geopolitical uncertainty.

In the mid- to long term, however, the peg will become less important, as the UAE transitions to a knowledge-based economy – and becomes yet more independent from the oil and gas sector . The assertiveness of the new Saudi measures thus seems to bring concrete risks to the UAE's economic superiority, prompting them to respond immediately with several policies benefiting foreign companies. Today, however, the government of Abu Dhabi wants to go further, aiming at the development of the real estate and infrastructural sectors – above all transport – in a sustainable manner . At the same time, also Saudi Arabia considers the attraction of international investors as a priority. However, Riyadh is still far behind Abu Dhabi, given that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman announced the ambitious plan "Vision 2030" – which includes a willingness to boost the global investment market and an economic diversification strategy – in 2016 only.

Nevertheless, Saudi authorities hope to catch up with the delay soon, also planning to implement new legal reforms based on credit structures. From 2005 to 2015, King ABDALLAH bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud incrementally modernized the Kingdom. These reforms have accelerated under King SALMAN bin Abd al-Aziz, who ascended to the throne in 2015, and has since lifted the Kingdom's ban on women driving and allowed cinemas to operate for the first time in decades.

Saudi Arabia saw some protests during the 2011 Arab Spring but not the level of bloodshed seen in protests elsewhere in the region. Shia Muslims in the Eastern Province protested primarily against the detention of political prisoners, endemic discrimination, and Bahraini and Saudi Government actions in Bahrain. Riyadh took a cautious but firm approach by arresting some protesters but releasing most of them quickly and by using its state-sponsored clerics to counter political and Islamist activism.

The United Arab Emirates' oil and natural gas reserves are the world's sixth and seventh-largest, respectively. Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, ruler of Abu Dhabi and the country's first president, oversaw the development of the Emirates by investing oil revenues into healthcare, education, and infrastructure. The United Arab Emirates has the most diversified economy among the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. In the 21st century, the country has become less reliant on oil and gas, and is economically focusing on tourism and business. The government does not levy income tax, although there is a corporate tax in place and a 5% value-added tax was established in 2018.

Since the 1970s, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other countries have contributed to religious and cultural institutions in the region. In the 80s, the Saudis led Gulf investment there by buying and leasing arable land in an ongoing quest for food security. More recently in 2015, Saudi-led Arab intervention in support of the internationally-recognised government of Yemen created an imperative for the governments in Riyadh and the UAE to develop strategic positions on the Red Sea coast of Africa to support their campaign.

Along with its status in the Middle East and its reputation as the largest exporter of oil, the kingdom has cherished the fact that its territory includes the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, the two principal pilgrim destinations for Muslims. Of the three, the religious role is said to be the most important to most Saudis, at least in the past. The COVID era has led to drastic cutbacks in the number of pilgrims allowed, but the authorities take pride in the smoothness of the arrangements they have had to introduce. Those details are handled by the ulema, the clerical leadership, who were 20 years ago essentially partners, albeit junior ones, in coalition with the House of Saud governing the kingdom. But that has changed; their power is much diminished, as is the power of the wider House of Saud. Essentially, the kingdom is ruled by the King Salman/MbS duopoly, with a significant junior role being played by deputy defense minister Prince Khalid bin Salman, aka KbS, a younger brother of the crown prince.

In the Gulf crisis's aftermath, President Farmajo's declaration that he would remain neutral was met with scepticism in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, who perceived his government as wedded to Qatar and Turkey. In response, Abu Dhabi appears to have doubled down on its relations with other Somali factions and Somalia's federal states, prompting anger from senior Somali officials and disquiet among Western and African diplomats. The government's use of its rivals' alleged Emirati backing to justify crackdowns and adoption of anti-Emirati rhetoric to play to its nationalist base has not helped. Farmajo's reluctance to cut ties with Qatar and Turkey makes sense, particularly given the scale of Turkish aid and investment, though his increasing reliance on both countries has further soured relations with the UAE.

Still more perilous is the deterioration in Farmajo's relations with Somalia's federal states. As his government refused to distance itself from Qatar, federal states, some of which depend on Emirati investment and chafed at Mogadishu charting a course on the Gulf crisis they perceived as contrary to their interests, took a public stand against his position. Circumventing the capital, some appear to have accelerated negotiations with DP World – an Emirati conglomerate the activity of which is widely perceived as serving Abu Dhabi's strategic goals – over deals that would see DP World develop and manage their ports.

Recent months have seen increasingly heated recriminations between senior government officials and federal state leaders, some of whom have made provocatively timed trips to Abu Dhabi. The UAE is a politically and economically stable country and holds the 25th position globally in Global Competitiveness Report 2019 by World Economic Forum. In addition, it stands out as one of the 10 largest donor states in official development aid . Recognised as a tolerant country, the UAE hosts more than 200 nationalities doing business, living, learning and touring the UAE. At the same time, the large share of the total population as expatriates presented serious challenges for the local labor force. Among those, being overly dependent on foreigners in general and working in the public sector are top of the Gulf countries' governments concerns.

With growing global pressures from new technologies in extracting shale oil and shale gas, the need for more sustainable economies is even more pressing. For that to happen and for a better future, the local labor force and in particular the youth is at the heart of the transformation of the region. At the same time, several other sectors could be subjected to the KSA-UAE economic competition.

The first one is the touristic sector, where Saudi Arabia hopes to strategically insert itself. With its skyscrapers and luxury resorts, Dubai holds the regional record in the tourism industry , but many of the Emirate's main attractions are beginning to be outdated, requiring costly renovations that would also involve foreign capital. Consequently, Riyadh would like to take advantage of this aspect to "steal" tourists from the UAE, also aiming at non-religious forms of tourism.

Many of these are located in the Aseer region, on the Saudi Red Sea coast, where the Kingdom has already started implementing high-profile financial infrastructure plans. Specifically, Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund has already launched a $3 billion investment project in February 2020, aiming to build 2,700 hotel rooms, 1,300 residential units, and 30 commercial and entertainment attractions in the region by 2030. In addition, on September 28, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman declared his intention to expand this project by injecting liquidity into the local market of up to 12 trillion riyals (approximately $3 trillion).

Not to mention that, if the construction of the Jeddah Tower is completed in the short term, Saudi Arabia will possess the tallest tower in the world, a clear sign of its ambitions to become competitive in the luxury tourism sector as well. In this regard, another remarkable example can be found by looking at the case of al-Ula, a city in the northwest of the Kingdom. With more than 27,000 archaeological sites dating back to the Nabatean era, this city carved in stone was declared a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 2008. That is why, to increase its notoriety, Riyad is planning to build a luxury tourist resort within the site itself by 2024, with forty suites, three villas, a conference center, and fourteen private pavilions. One example of low-hanging fruit that could engender goodwill would be a UAE recalibration of its actions in Yemen, where Saudi Arabia has a disproportionate strategic interest.

Other foreign policy issues of joint concern include three related aspects of the important relationship with the US. Arguably the most important article of the GCC charter is Article 4, which states that the alliance was formed to strengthen relations among its member countries and to promote cooperation among the countries' citizens. The GCC also has a defense planning council that coordinates military cooperation between member countries. The highest decision-making entity of the GCC is the Supreme Council, which meets on an annual basis and consists of GCC heads of state. The Ministerial Council, made up of foreign ministers or other government officials, meets every three months to implement the decisions of the Supreme Council and to propose new policy.

The administrative arm of the alliance is the office of the Secretariat-General, which monitors policy implementation and arranges meetings. In preparing for a post-hydrocarbon future, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are simultaneously seeking to develop some of the same sectors, notably tourism, financial services, petrochemicals, and technology. Of the two countries, the UAE made the earlier start and enjoys first-mover advantage in transforming itself into a business, trade, and tourism hub.

Of late, however, Saudi Arabia has mounted a challenge, moving to expand its tourism sector and offering a larger market and loosening lifestyle restrictions to attract investors, international companies, and foreign talent. The Emirates have implemented counter-measures, such as issuing new visa rules and switching to a Monday-Friday work week. The UAE has developed from a juxtaposition of Bedouin tribes to one of the world's most wealthy states in only about 50 years.

Is Saudi Arabia And UAE Same Country Between 2000 and 2018, average real gross domestic product growth was at close to 4%. It is the second largest economy in the GCC , with a nominal gross domestic product of US$414.2 billion, and a real GDP of 392.8 billion constant 2010 USD in 2018. Since its independence in 1971, the UAE's economy has grown by nearly 231 times to 1.45 trillion AED in 2013. The non-oil trade has grown to 1.2 trillion AED, a growth by around 28 times from 1981 to 2012. Backed by the world's seventh-largest oil deposits, and thanks to considerate investments combined with decided economic liberalism and firm Government control, the UAE has seen their real GDP more than triple in the last four decades.

Nowadays the UAE is one of the world's richest countries, with GDP per capita almost 80% higher than OECD average. The two countries are also known for being close allies in terms of foreign policy and geopolitical interests, collaborating closely during the 2017–18 Qatar diplomatic crisis and backing anti-Muslim Brotherhood governments in Libya, Tunisia and Egypt. A striking example of Gulf co-operation, and its growing diplomatic heft, was the central role the UAE and Saudi Arabia played in brokering the historic peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea in July 2018. Adding to its already strong ties to Eritrea, Emirati diplomats also gradually developed closer relations with Ethiopia – largely through deployment of much-needed investment and financial opportunities.

Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed, Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, held crucial meetings with Ethiopian and Eritrean officials that helped end two decades of conflict. This was backed by $3 billion in support for Ethiopia from the UAE, in addition to existing aid to Eritrea, and sealed with a high-profile signing ceremony in Jeddah. Dr. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen is a Baker Institute fellow for the Middle East and Non-Resident Senior Fellow at Gulf International Forum. Previously, he worked as senior Gulf analyst at the Gulf Center for Strategic Studies between 2006 and 2008 and as co-director of the Kuwait Program on Development, Governance and Globalization in the Gulf States at the London School of Economics from 2008 until 2013. For years, Gulf and Turkish assistance, including direct budgetary support, humanitarian aid, infrastructure development, and training and funding for Somali security forces, has been critical for Somalis and welcomed by successive Somali governments.

Their engagement has always involved some jockeying for influence in a country of enormous strategic value, given its proximity to the Gulf, centrality to Red Sea security and string of ports with vantages on key shipping routes. In April 2018, Mogadishu-Abu Dhabi relations took their worst turn yet, when Somali officials confiscated millions of dollars from an Emirati plane in Mogadishu, citing the money as evidence of Abu Dhabi's meddling. According to Emirati officials, the funds were destined for Somali security forces whose salaries it has long been paying. Those officials point to years of Emirati subventions to Somali forces fighting pirates and Al-Shabaab – support welcomed by successive Somali governments. Frustrated at the seizure, Abu Dhabi halted aid projects, pulled all personnel from and abandoned the Mogadishu base at which it was training Somali security forces. As relations between the Farmajo government and Abu Dhabi unravel, any one of the intra-Somali disputes – in Mogadishu; between the Farmajo government and the regions; or between it and Somaliland – could escalate.